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KUm V oroshilov and the Red Cavalry: Reassessing
the Most Incompetent Man in the ~ed Army
Stephen Brown (University of Wollongong)

Cavalrymen have not had a good press in the twentieth century,
especially when their responsibilities have extended outside their
specialist field. In his memoirs, former Prime Minister Lloyd George
blamed the 'ridiculous cavalry obsession' of his generals for the
needless deaths of British soldiers in World War One. I A variation on
this theme is to be found in the literature concerning the Red Army in
the lead-up to the Second World War. Here the alleged culprit was
KErn Voroshilov (1881-1969), the man chosen by Joseph Stalin to
serve as Peoples Commissar for Military and Naval Affairs from 1925
to 1934 and Commissar for Defence from 1934 to 1940. Voroshilov
gained his battlefield experience in the Russian Civil War of 1918-20
when he was a commander of the First Cavalry Army, the largest and
most successful of tpe Red Army's cavalry units. For most
commentators, Voroshilov remained throughout his life a cavalry
enthusiast who 'insisted on a larger role in maneuver warfare being
played by horse cavalry'2 long after it was obvious that the age of the
mounted soldier had passed. Voroshilov has assumed the role of an
archetypal military villain, a 'dim-witted political genera!' 3 and 'a
talentless, unattractive mediocrity,4 whose passion for the cavalry and
slavish devotion to Joseph Stalin helped to ensure that the Red Army
was not ready to fight the early battles of World War Two. 5
While it is not uncommon for soldiers to find that their careers
are evaluated less positively after they have passed from the scene,
Voroshilov's fall from grace was spectacular by any standards. A
Bolshevik since 1903, Voroshilov found himself involved in the
organisation of the Red Army at the outset of the Civil War in 1918.
Despite the fact that he had no previous military experience, he rose to
become an army and front commander. His alliance with Stalin began
when the two men served as members of the revolutionary military
councils that directed the Tenth Army and South Front in 1918.
Voroshilov and Stalin teamed up again in 1919 to help organise the
First Cavalry Army whose commander was the legendary cavalryman,
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Semen Budennyi. Joining the revolutionary military council of the
First Cavalry Army, Voroshilov acted as co-commander and political'
organiser of what would prove to be the Red Army's most successful
cavalry unit. After the Civil War, Stalin relied upon veterans of the
First Cavalry Army to consolidate his hold over the Soviet military
establishment. Having taken over leadership of the Red Army in 1925,
Voroshilov initiated the Stalin cult by writing the hagiographic Stalin
and the Civil War which first appeared in 1929. The favour was
returned when Soviet literature of the 1930s exaggerated Voroshilov's
achievements in the Civil War, passed over in silence his defeats and
praised him as a military organiser of genius.
After Stalin's death, Voroshilov fell from favour with
Khrushchev and his involvement in the failed 'Anti-Party Plot'
ensured that during the last eleven years of his life, he was subjected to
increasing criticism. In particular, Voroshilov fared badly in
comparisons with his great rival and deputy of the inter-war years,
Mikhail Tukhachevskii. 6 Tukhachevskii served as a tsarist officer in
World War One, was the Red Army's most successful commander in
the Civil War and in the 1920s earned a reputation as a military
theorist of world standing. Soviet writers in the era of de-Stalinisation
considered that Tukhachevskii was the real leader of the Red Army
and its likely commander-in-chief were war to have broken out.
Whether this would indeed have happened will never be known for
Tukhachevskii was the most famous victim of the notorious military
purge that struck the Red Army in the late 1930s. The arrest and
execution of Tukhachevskii in June 1937 was the trigger for the
removal of thousands of Red Army officers from their posts,
effectively decapitating the Red Army on the eve of World War Two.
Veterans of the First Cavalry Army were the only group to
survive the purge of the high command more or less intact,1 John
Erickson and Robert Conquest have argued that the impetus for the
military purge came from Stalin and that the dictator's determination
to rid civilian politics of all those who were not his creatures
inevitably extended to the military command. s The leaders of the First
Cavalry Army were spared because they represented the only group
within the high command whose loyalty had never been in question.
Other commentators have speculated that Voroshilov may not simply
have presided over the purge on Stalin's orders but actively pursued
the destruction of his fellow commanders. We now know that
discussions were held in 1936 between Tukhachevskii and fellow

officers as to ways of bringing about the dismissal of Voroshilov.
Attention has been called to Voroshilov's background in the Red
cavalry and the siege mentality of the mounted arm in the face of what
appeared to be inevitable redundancy once, sufficient tanks were
available.lO On the surface, it seems plausible that the military purge
was, at least in part, a cavalryman's coup by means of which
Voroshilov aimed to preserve his leadership and safeguard the future
of the Red cavalry.
There is no space here to reassess every aspect of Voroshilov's
fifteen-year reign over the Red Army. This paper is limited to
reassessing a key charge against Voroshilov, his alleged obsession with
the Red cavalry. It will be argued that Voroshilov's cavalry bias was a
figment of the imagination of Soviet historians writing in the era of
de-Stalinisation, an assessment that soon found an echo in accounts of
the Red Army that would appear in the West. Evidence that
Voroshilov acted as an advocate of the Red cavalry comes mainly
from his public pronouncements. Thus, Voroshilov boasted to the
Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 that cavalry numbers had increased
by 52% between 1935 and 1939. 11 A year earlier he gave an
assessment of the Red cavalry that claimed:
Cavalry in every army of the world is undergoing or, more accurately, has
undergone, a crisis and in many armies has completely died out. .. We take a
crushing
different view ... The Red cavalry, as before, is a battle-winning and
12
military force that can and will decide military tasks on all fronts.

Quotations' such as the one above are often cited to demonstrate
Voroshilov's misplaced faith in mounted warfare but are misleading
when viewed in isolation. It would be easy, on the basis of
Voroshilov's speeches, to show that the Defence Commissar supported
each and every part of the Red Army. Official Soviet discourse did not
allow for public debate of sensitive issues. To establish Voroshilov's
views, we need to examine not just his published writings and speeches
but also the private comments he made in discussions with his fellow
commanders of the Red Army. Among the documents made available
from Soviet archives in recent years are the transcripts of the
discussions heid .at the annual review and planning meetings of the Red
Army. Until 1934, the most senior commanders of the Red Army met
as members of the Revolutionary Military Council or Rewoensovet,
and thereafter as members of an advisory Defence Council attached to
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the Defence Commissariat. Voroshilov's public support for the Red
cavalry did not carry through into these private discussions involving
his fellow Red Army commanders. Underlying his commentary on the
Red cavalry is a consistent concern about the likely impotence of
cavalry in a future war, a concern that places Voroshi10v squarely in
the camp of the cavalry sceptics and not of the cavalry enthusiasts.
Preparing the Red cavalry for modem warfare was one of the
great challenges for the Soviet military establishment of the inter-war
period. The Red cavalry of the I 920s was called upon· to learn to fight
dismounted, to shoottnore accurately and to cooperate more
effectively with infantry, machine guns and artillery. It was recognised
that the cavalry would need aerial support, anti-aircraft guns and
tactical refinements designed to offer protection from air attack. In
addition, the cavalry was expected to know how to move at night, to
find shelter in forests and to ford major rivers. The Red cavalry
struggled to meet the objectives set for it. Veteran cavalrymen
accepted the importance of firepower but insisted that proper training
in the traditional cavalry skills was also necessary. Heading the Red
cavalry for much of the inter-war period was one such veteran, Semen
Budennyi, the founder of the First Cavalry Army 'and the Red Army's
Inspector of Cavalry from 1924 to 1937. Budennyi and Voroshilov
remained life-long friends but the same could not be said of
Budennyi's relationship with Tukhachevskii or the other principal
moderniser of the inter-war period, Vladimir Triandiffillov. In his The
Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies published in 1929,
Triandifillov wrote that cavalry could participate in modem war only
by means of fire weapons and ruled out altogether the use of charges
in formation or cold steel. I4 The ripostes from Budennyi were often
vitriolic betraying the insecurity of many Red cavalrymen.
Historians have tended to conflate the outlook of Voroshilov
and Budennyi on the issue of the Red cavalry. Budennyi was a dyedin-the-wool cavalryman whose handlebar moustache and cavalry
experience extended back to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.
Budennyi represented a xenophobic, anti-modem trend in the Red
Army. He complained that the secret collaboration with the German
Army in the 1920s was 'turning the heads of the Red Army's young
commanders'.15 Voroshilov, by contrast, was one of the Red Army's
staunchest supporters of the military collaboration between the Soviet
Union and the Weimar RepUblic. Triandifillov noted in 1927 that 'we
argue about cavalry every year... in the past year only V oroshilov has

supported me' .16 In 1928, Voroshilov asked Alexander Egorov, an
ally from (he Civil War to tone down his criticisms of Tukhachevskii's
leadership of the Red Army's failed attack on Warsaw in August
1920.17 Voroshilov's displays of even handedness extended to the Red
cavalry's supporters as well as to its critics, In 1928 when a draft
containing the damning judgment that 'cavalry was not prepared or
suited to modem war' was submitted to the Revvoensovet, Voroshilov
argued that the offending passage be struck out of the final report. 18
In part, Voroshilov strove to appear objective in disputes among
his subordinates in order to establish his authority over a military
establishment that retained a degree of independence until the 1937
purge. On the other hand, V oroshilov could not help but make his
reservations about the mounted arm known. Reviewing the Red
Army's performance each year, Voroshilov was often critical of each
arm of the Red Army, but he often reserved his most damning remarks
for the cavalry. In 1929, Voroshilov summed up the Red cavalry's
performance in bleak terms, noting that the Red cavalrymen were
quite good with their horses and weapons but as units they were failing
in their tasks. V oroshilov complained that the Red cavalry had gone
backwards since the Civil War for it could no longer cooperate
effectively with artillery and machine gunners. He was unhappy with
the reconnaissance over both short and longer distances while the work
of guarding the cavalry on the move and at rest was equally bad.
V oroshilov virtually wrote off the previous seven years of training
when he complained that 'at present the Red cavalry could do little
more than shout hurrah and charge'. The vulnerability of cavalry to
attack from the air especially troubled Voroshilov who reminded
Budennyi that during the Civil War, the First Cavalry Army's worst
defeat was brought about by Polish aircraft, who slaughtered fifteen
hundred cavalrymen on a single day in August 1920. 19
The Red Army was to be transformed by the first Five-Year
Plan that got under way in 1928. By the mid 1930s, the Red Army had
an army of tanks and aircraft that for the most part lived up to Soviet
boasts of having a modem fighting force the equal of any in the
world. 20 The enthusiasm underlying the development of new
equipment for the Red Army had its counterpart in the military
theorising of Tukhachevskii, Triandifillov and others about how to use
the tanks and planes in a series of crushing blows aimed at the deep
rear of the enemy. This idea of 'deep battle' and later 'deep
operations' became part of Red Army doctrine and the writings of
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Tukhachevskii and his fellow modernisers earned praise around the
world. Ironically, mechanisation led to a second lease of life for the
Red cavalry whose numbers increased substantially in the mid 1930s.
In 1929, there were twelve cavalry divisions with a total strength of
21
77,000 sabres. In 1935 the number of cavalry divisions increased to
thirty-two, albeit in a period when the Red Army more than doubled
in size. It was neither Budennyi's histrionics nor favouritism on the
part of Voroshilov that lay behind this cavalry revival but
Tukhachevskii's concept of deep battle. Initially, deep battle assumed
close cooperation between tank formations, infantry and cavalry. The
first stage, the forming of the breech, did not involve cavalry but the
second stage of developing the tactical success would require the
mobility not only of large tank units but 'mechanised' cavalry,
meaning cavalry units supported by tanks and infantry.22
Tukhachevskii not only welcomed the creation of two c'l,valry corps in
1932, but he was almost apologetic for his earlier disparaging of the
Red cavalry. As Tukhachevskii put it, 'a few years back we were
talking about the end of cavalry but now the role of cavalry has grown
significantly - specifically with the advance of mechanisation'. 23
Budennyi was especially happy with this new state of affairs.
With an evident sense of self-justification he noted that:
For many years everybody cursed the cavalry. But that was because they did
not understand it. Now great changes are happening in our country. We are
changing too and so too are our tactics and operative art. If in the past we
thought the way forward was to smash the forward defences of the opponent
now we demand that the opponents whole system of defence be attacked in
all of its depth not only from a tactical point of view but from an operational
point ofview. 24

Voroshilov, by contrast, took little comfort in this temporary detente
among his subordinates. Voroshilov was neither satisfied with the
theory of deep battle, nor with the performance of the Red cavalry. He
did not think that deep battle was particularly new given that punching
a hole in the enemy's defences and exploiting the breach with cavalry
was the thinking at the outset of W orld War One. Voroshilov
complained that Tukhachevskii failed to take into account that the
enemy would be moving and that therefore there would not be a static
defence to be penetrated. Voroshilov did not see how the tanks could
be properly supported and he worried about the tank's vulnerability to
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anti-tank aircraft. Voroshilov may have missed the subtler points of
deep battle but he was not arguing for the tank to be replaced by the
horse. Voroshilov fully supported the Red Army's mechanisation even
if he argued constantly with Tukhachevskii about how this was to be
achieved. Thus, in 1930 Voroshilov, backed by Stalin, engaged in a
major dispute with Tukhachevskii over the latter's plans for
mechanising the army. The point of contention was not any
conservatism on the part of Stalin and Voroshilov but whether the
necessary resources could be found to tum Tukhachevskii' s plans into
reality.25
Even as cavalry numbers were increased in 1935, Voroshilov
declared himself unimpressed by arguments from the cavalry that the
dismounted cavalryman was as good as an infantryman. Cavalry was a
poor substitute for infantry because only two out of three cavalrymen
were able to fire their rifle while the third tended to the horses. Divebombers and chemical weapons were, in Voroshilov's opinion,
insurmountable obstacles for the cavalry. In 1935, Voroshilov
addressed Budennyi directly:
I don't know whether Semen Mikhailovich (Budennyi) will agree with me.
As an old cavalryman he is fond of cavalry in its pure form, so to speak. He
finds it hard to accept the loss of cavalry of a type that has existed for
centuries. 26

V oroshilov did not mince his words, remarking that:
I must say that my impression is that in present conditions, given the
contemporary tekhnika of the enemy, given the fact that the enemy is able to
use fire from the ground and from the air and has the capacity to use chemical
weapons, cavalry will fmd it very difficult to fight at all. 27

At the end of 1935, the Soviet military establishment seemed to be at
the peak of its power and prestige?S The military budget was huge,
the Red Army boasted many more tanks and aircraft, the post of
marshal was reintroduced with V oroshilov, Tukhachevskii, Budennyi,
Alexander Egorov and Vasilii Bliukher being the first five to be so
honoured. Many cavalry units were now renamed as Cossack units as
so many of them were known in the Russian Army. On the other hand,
1936 saw not just the first of the civilian 'show trials' but an
increasing number of arrests of Soviet military personnel. One of the
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few acknowledgments handed out by historians to Voroshilov is that
he successfully quarantined the military from the less murderous
purges of 1929-30 and 1933-34. 29 Far from welcoming the new
purge, Voroshi1ov tried an argument that had worked in the past, that
the armed forces attracted more politically conscious personnel than
other areas of the Soviet state. At the February-March plenum in
1937, Voroshilov contended that not many wreckers had been
discovered, the reason being that the military attracted the best and
most loyal citizens of the Soviet state. Molotov contradicted
Voroshilov and refused to accept that the military was immune to
infiltration by scheming wreckers and Gestapo agents. 3D Soon after,
Voroshilov fell into line and did all that was asked of him in carrying
out the purge. At his trial, TUkhachevskii was accused of working for
the Nazis, plotting against Voroshilov and being biased against the Red
cavalry. The last charge was made by Budennyi. While it is now
apparent that the purge took a smaller percentage of the high
command than previously thought - earlier acounts estimated that as
many as half the total number of officers were purged31 _ the havoc
wreaked at the very top of the Red Anny and the gradual progress
downwards of the arrests and executions into the lower ranks undid
years of effort and planning. Voroshilov made no effort to save any of
his fellow officers or their families. Whether he had come to believe
the charges against his fonner colleagues or whether he acted as he did
for reasons of self-preservation or vengeance is impossible to know.
What is clear is that the purge did not coincide with any change
in attitude on the part of Voroshilov towards the Red cavalry.
Voroshilov's address to the surviving members of the Military Council
at the end of 1937, now dominated by veterans of the Red cavalry, did
little to ease the apprehension of the cavalry leaders. Voroshilov
acknowledged that there were theatres of war such as the East and
Near East where cavalry still might play a role but emphasised that
'we have to reduce the cavalry in size and increase the size of other
anns'. The Defence Commissar was of the opinion that in future it
was likely that 'cavalry will playa truly modest role on our western
theatre, archmodest, perhaps an auxiliary, third-rate role'. Voroshilov
was just as adamant at this meeting that large tank fonnations would
remain, that they were necessary 'for contemporary battle, for
contemporary war'.32 Budennyi objected strongly to Voroshilov's
assertion that the Red Anny had 'plenty of cavalry', retorting that
there was 'very little cavalry, in fact' and claimed that 'as soon as the
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war begins all will shout give us cavalry'. VoroshiIov's response was
unyielding:
You are talking with your cavalryman's heart and I well understand it. As a
man and a cavalryman I sympathise... But reality is moving away from us
and we would be cava1rymen of the medieval type - Don Quixote was a
cavalryman too - if we do not take account ofreality.33

Cavalry numbers were not as meagre as Budennyi made out but had
indeed stagnated after the expansion of 1935. During the purge years
of 1936 to 1939 the number of cavalry divisions remained the same
while the number of infantry divisions increased from ninety to one
hundred and fifty.34 As a Soviet history of the Red cavalry put it,
many cavalrymen
survived the purge only to be retrained as tank
35
drivers.
If the purge really were a cavalryman's coup aimed at
preserving the mounted ann, it clearly failed in its mission.
Voroshilov was removed as Commissar for Defence in 1940
after the disastrous winter war with Finland. His place was taken by
another veteran of the First Cavalry Anny, Semen Timoshenko. A
damning report was prepared on Voroshilov's failure to resolve the
Red Anny problems although one of the few accusations not to be
made against him was that he had relied too much on cavalry. When
the Nazi thunderbolt fell on 22 June 1941 Stalin responded by
dividing his front line into three commands, with Voroshilov taking
the northwestern part of the line, Timoshenko put in charge of the
centre and Budennyi the south. It was a measure of how much Stalin
valued political loyalty in the anny. As the entire front crumbled
under the Gennan onslaught all three fonner cavalrymen were
replaced, none showing any particular ability for field command in
modern conditions albeit in a situation that would have tested the most
gifted commander. In the Civil War, Voroshilov taught himself to
shoot and ride with the best of the men he led but his strengths lay in
organisation and personal bravery, not in tactics or strategy.
Voroshilov's value to the Red Anny in the 1920s and 30s was always
going to be as an administrator and advocate of the anned forces to its
political masters not as a military theorist or fighter in the field.
The idea that Voroshilov was obsessed with the Red cavalry was
an invention of de-Stalinisation, a convenient way to contain as much
as possible the blame for the military purge and the Red Anny's poor
showing in 1941. Voroshilov was an excellent military villain, a vain
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and uneducated Communist upstart who was so stupid as to believe
that the Red Army could sabre its way to victory in the coming war.
The scapegoating of Voroshilov was able to build on images of
discredited World War One generals hopelessly out of touch with the
new weaponry and refighting the battles of the Napoleonic era.
Voroshilov was an excellent foil to the able Tukhachevskii, the latter
held up as the model of a good Communist and a truly professional
soldier. That these stories were unhelpful caricatures is all too obvious
now. Voroshilov was not opposed to tanks, nor did he favour the
cavalry. Tukhachevskii's plans were often unrealistic and he helped to
prepare his own demise by taking part in the removal and humiliation
of fellow veterans of the tsarist army.36 From the litany of woes that
beset the Red Army on the eve of World War Two, we can at least
subtract one of its alleged weaknesses. While Voroshilov must take his
share of the blame for the failings of the Soviet military establishment,
the Red Army did not suffer for fifteen years under the leadership of a
man inflexibly committed to the cavalry arm.
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